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LOVE IT OR LEAVE IT: PROPERTY
RULES, LIABILITY RULES, AND





The traditional rule in partnership law is that a claim for "final accounting"
is a partner's exclusive remedy. Under this rule, withdrawal from a partnership
must precede or accompany legal actions against one's partners. A partner must
"love it or leave it," with judicial attention available only after leaving the
relationship. Rather plainly, this rule can be unfair and inefficient. At the same
time, there is something attractive about the idea of encouraging private
compromise by limiting the availability of courts to parties that are unable to
continue their relationships.
Part II of this article introduces this tension by discussing the evolution of
the rules of partnership law away from the love-it-or-leave-it, or "exclusivity,"
tradition and by comparing traditional partnership law first to domestic relations
law, where the love-it-or-leave-it character of remedies is even more striking,
and then to corporate law, where the structure of remedies is almost reversed.
Parts III and IV connect this exploration of remedies to a familiar framework
in the law-and-economics literature that compares property rules and liability
rules. The connection reveals new ways of thinking about the remedies in
partnership law and casts light on the occasional attractiveness of love-it-or-
leave-it rules. Part V compares the selection of remedies in business and in
marriage, with some reference to other relationships as well. Part VI offers
some concluding comments about love-it-or-leave-it strategies and the evolution
of our legal system.
II
LOVE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT RULES IN PARTNERSHIP AND OTHER LAW
Imagine that A and B are partners in a business and B believes that A has
wrongfully exploited B or otherwise breached the partnership agreement. The
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traditional rule is that if B seeks damages from A or from the AB partnership
for the alleged wrong, B will be required first to ask the court for a final
accounting, which in turn often requires the dissolution of the partnership.' On
its face, the rule denies B the power to sue the ongoing partnership enterprise
while simultaneously avoiding the costs of dissolution, the most important of
which may be the value of B's share of the ongoing concern.2 It is easy to
imagine that this exclusivity (of remedies) rule can leave wrongs uncorrected
and in this way permit an unhealthy degree of exploitation of a minority
partnership interest. A related intuition is that when the future prospects of a
partnership look promising, one partner may be especially tempted to exploit
another unless there is reason to fear external legal intervention. This intuition,
however, is difficult to pin down.
There are at least three strategies for understanding the traditional
exclusivity, or all-or-nothing, rule and the steady migration away from this
seemingly strange, anachronistic, unfair, and inefficient rule.3 First, we might
examine partnership cases in order to identify the inevitable exceptions to the
rule. Most harsh or striking rules have numerous exceptions, and this one is no
different.' As the exceptions grow in number and importance, the original rule
is more likely either to appear in retrospect to have reflected some evolutionary
or legal accident or be otherwise anachronistic. Either way, surging exceptions
can be taken as evidence of healthy evolution away from the rule. If we focus
on either of two straightforward explanations of the origin of this particular
exclusivity rule-with no attention to similar rules in other areas of
law--evolution and abandonment of the rule seem predictable. One explana-
tion suggests that the rule arises out of a formalist conception of the "aggregate
theory" of partnerships.5 Courts in an earlier era might have had trouble
imagining a lawsuit going on within a partnership, much as we would find it
bizarre to imagine or to allow one division of a corporation to sue another
1. See, e.g., Goff v. Bergerman, 50 P.2d 59, 61 (Colo. 1935) (the exclusivity rule requires both a
final accounting and a settlement of partnership affairs); see also 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 6.08(b) (1988) ("Prior to the [Uniform
Partnership Act], the action for an accounting was generally denied except incident to dissolution.").
2. This assumes that the going concern value will not always be salvaged by a purchase and
refinancing on the part of a surviving partner. If going concern value (partnership value) is never
lost-which under some rarefied economic assumptions is the case-then most of the rules discussed
in this paper make no difference at all. But there are reasons to think that withdrawals can sink
profitable enterprises. For example, outsiders, including creditors, may have difficulty discerning which
enterprises have going concern value. Moreover, there are arrangements where continuity can be
threatened because of legal or other institutional hurdles. Thus, partners may bring unique skills or
legal licenses to a venture-all of which may be inalienable-so that dissolution can be mutually
threatening and not simply overcome by a buyout.
3. See infra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 8.
5. When treating partnerships as aggregates of individuals, "suing a partnership would be
characterized [by the common law] as being on both sides of the case." BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra
note 1, at §§ 1.03(b), 6.08(c). The exclusivity rule survived a gradual shift toward an "entity theory"
of partnerships. Id. § 6.08(c); see also Sertich v. Moorman, 783 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Ariz. 1989) (noting that
earlier courts did not view the partnership as separate entity).
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division of the same firm. 6  The second explanation for the origins of the
exclusivity rule can be drawn from the distinction between law and equity.7
As for the evolution of the exclusivity rule in partnership law, there are in
fact modern cases that virtually dispose of the rule.8 The Uniform Partnership
Act encourages the demise of the rule, although there is some reason to think
that the rule lives on despite what a casual reading of the Act would first
suggest.9 The "Revised" Uniform Partnership Act seeks to bury the exclusivity
rule by allowing almost any cause of action by a partner against the partnership
or against other partners without a final accounting or dissolution."0 Further
6. JOHN COLLYER, PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 264 (5th ed. 1861)
("useless for one partner to recover what, upon taking a general account amongst all partners, he might
be liable to refund").
Another explanation for the exclusivity rule is that it saved judicial resources. See infra note 71.
7. The exclusivity rule on its face is about the distinction between law and equity. The rule
precludes suits at law until after the equitable remedy of a full accounting has been had. Sertich, 783
P.2d at 1201-02 (describing the exclusivity rule as an anomaly that arose from the common law
distinction between law and equity).
8. Id. at 1201-05 (abandoning the exclusivity rule in Arizona). For more limited exceptions, see
Hanes v. Giambrone, 471 N.E.2d 801 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (action to collect partnership contributions
with no accounting); Fulton v. Baxter, 596 P.2d 540 (Okla. 1979) (fiduciary breach suit in absence of
accounting). More generally, courts have made an exception for situations in which "by some special
agreement the particluar matter has been withdrawn from the partnership account." Kunneke v. Mapel,
53 N.E. 259, 261 (Ohio 1899). Similarly, courts have allowed the equitable remedy of a constructive
trust without requiring accounting and dissolution. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, § 6.08(c)(8).
See generally Susan Swinson, Partner v. Partner: Actions at Law for Wrongdoing in a Partnership, 9 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 905 (1993).
9. As noted below, any reference to the Uniform Partnership Act, or UPA, risks ambiguity
because the "current" Uniform Partnership Act (1994) is commonly but not officially referred to as the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act, or RUPA. The 1914 Act (with the usual changes over the years)
is commonly referred to as the Uniform Partnership Act. In any event, the immediate reference in the
text is to the better known Uniform Partnership Act (1914). In terms of the issues discussed here, its
basic structure is as follows: (1) Any partner can force dissolution unless there is an agreement to the
contrary, including an express or implied agreement to continue the partnership for a specified term.
See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31 (last amended 1914), 6 U.L.A. at 376 (1969). Moreover, any partner
can terminate a partnership, although doing so may breach the agreement. Id. §§ 31, 38, 6 U.L.A at
376, 456. Any partner has a right to formal accounting (without dissolving the partnership) when (a)
wrongfully excluded from the business, (b) if the partnership agreement provides for the right, (c) a
partner has appropriated an unauthorized benefit, or (d) whenever it is just and reasonable.. Id. § 22,
6 U.L.A. at 284.
The UPA (1914) thus encourages evolution away from the exclusivity rule by allowing courts to
describe claims (that include claims for full accounting but do not call for dissolution) as "just and
reasonable." Nonetheless, because the claimant must obtain an accounting (even without dissolution),
there is still an element of an all-or-nothing choice because the cost of an accounting (and the added
animosity arising from a legal action that imposes serious costs on the partnership) will discourage
actions in profitable partnerships. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 1, § 6.08(b) (noting that
predissolution accounting actions are rare for these reasons).
10. The Uniform Partnership Act (1994), previously and commonly known as the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act, or RUPA, abandons the exclusivity rule by allowing a partner to sue the partnership
or other partners for almost any cause of action without seeking an accounting. RUPA § 405(b) (last
amended 1994), 6 U.L.A. 280, 316 (Supp. 1995). Dissolution or, in the language of this Act,
"dissociation," remains something that can always be done, rightfully or wrongfully. Id. § 602,6 U.L.A.
at 325. The Official Comment to the new (model) statute notes that the abolition of the exclusivity rule
"reflects a new policy choice that partners should have access to the courts during the term of the
partnership to resolve claims against the partnership and other partners, leaving broad judicial discretion
to fashion appropriate remedies." RUPA § 405(b), 6 U.L.A. at 316 n.2 (Supp. 1995).
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focus on this first approach is unnecessary; a healthy evolution away from a
suboptimal and dated rule may be optimistic, lawyerly, and plausible, but it is
perhaps limited in relationship to partnership law. Moreover, the most
sophisticated commentators already follow this strategy.
A second approach to understanding the exclusivity rule, and the evolution
away from it, is to have some confidence in the lawmakers of earlier eras and
explore the possibility that the evolution from one rule to another reflects the
fact that reasonable observers might be uncertain which of several rules is
superior. 12  The exceptions that materialize in the shadow of a rule might
provide hints as to the perceived disadvantages of that rule." The discussion
below suggests that it is not obvious how to choose between conflicting
strategies for motivating peaceful compromise while discouraging strategic
exploitation among quarreling parties. The exclusivity rule in partnership law
might be one strategy aimed at this end, but it is difficult to evaluate, and,
therefore, it is an approach that might give way to permitting piecemeal
litigation and anticipating legal intervention in ongoing partnerships. In turn,
this latter approach might itself be displaced over time, when a return to
exclusivity is possible.
Finally, a third, though not necessarily unrelated strategy is to generalize the
problem and to ask when similar all-or-nothing rules are found in law. Much
as the traditional partnership rule tells a potential complaining partner that he
or she must love-it-or-leave-it, which is to say simply end the relationship or not
litigate at all, there are other areas of law where litigants must elect between
such extremes. The most familiar example is in domestic relations law.'"
11. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act. Not Ready for Prime Time, 49
Bus. LAW. 45, 61 (1993).
12. See Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 43 (1987).
13. Thus, there is evidence that courts imply agreements as to limited terms where no such explicit
agreements existed, in order to impose liability on a partner who ends a partnership With going concern
value. See Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A
Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV.
1, 20-27 (1982)[hereinafter Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant]. Professor Hillman, it should be noted,
disapproves of this judicial practice. Id. Foreign jurisdictions, interestingly enough, do not allow
partners to leave and pay damages if their partnership is for a specified term. See Robert W. Hillman,
Indissoluble Partnerships, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 691, 694-95 (1985). In unusual cases, U.S. courts may do
the same, perhaps in order to force bargaining. See Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739
F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1984). The apparent choice for courts between damages and prohibitions is the
subject of parts IV and V below.
The second approach described in the text differs from the "healthy evolution" described in the first
approach, in that the second approach anticipates a resting point with multiple equilibria rather than
a sense that less exclusivity is generally if not always better than more. Moreover, there is the
possibility that courts develop schemes in which love-it-or-leave-it rules are used for some cases and
not others, with the courts enjoying some flexibility when it comes to determining partnership liabilities.
It may be that the constructive trust exception to the exclusivity rule, see supra note 8, provides one
useful judicial tool.
14. The most familiar examples to lawyers may be the love-it-or-leave-it rule regarding attorney-
client litigation and the treatment of joint tenants and cotenants in property law. As for the first of
these, an attorney may not be on the opposite side of any litigation from his or her client. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1983); see Lake County Bar Ass'n v. Gargiulo, 404
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Indeed, if this article were not part of a symposium organized around
partnership law, it might have been most sensible to focus first on family law,
and especially on the normal exclusivity of the divorce remedy as a means of
asking why other areas of law evolved away from, or in some cases never
adopted, the all-or-nothing judicial attitude that is found where complaints
about marriage are concerned.
In the law of domestic relations, we do not expect a court to award contract
damages to a plaintiff who complains about a spouse's misconduct or laziness
or breach of an interspousal promise. Such a remedy might accompany or be
a part of a divorce settlement, or might simply be unavailable because of the
exclusive character of the divorce remedy.15 The judicial practice is not simply
the result of adhering to a nonmarket conception of a woman's traditional work
as wife and mother; a husband would also have trouble collecting damages from
a wife who broke a promise concerning the maintenance of hearth and home
(and had property with which to pay a judgment). 6 And either spouse would
N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1980) (lawyer disciplined after filing in same action claims on his own behalf against
each client and by each client against the other). Thus, an attorney may not even sue a client for
unpaid fees-until the entire attorney-client relationship comes to an end. Disclosure does not free the
attorney of this constraint. There is, of course, sometimes the option of ending the relationship and
forcing (which may be to say threatening) the client to seek other counsel and pay twice for some work.
See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 306 (1980). This love-it-or-leave-it rule does not, however, seem
to have much to do with other love-it-or-leave-it rules. It appears to reflect the special concern of the
law for conflicts or appearances of conflict between lawyer and client. The law worries that lawyers
may seem to root against their own clients if they are also seen to be in open conflict with these clients.
This concern may be misplaced, for it is arguable that uncollectible fees or unresolvable conflicts may
in fact lead to greater agency problems, but it is probably safe to set aside this love-it-or-leave-it rule
as a special case.
In the case of multiple ownership of property, there is a striking love-it-or-leave-it rule when courts
will not intervene in disputes among joint tenants or cotenants until one asks for a partition. See JOHN
E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 113 (3d ed. 1989). The
law in this area can also be explained as minimizing valuation tasks. See infra part V.B (valuation tasks
may explain difference between marriage and business partnership); Saul Levmore, Explaining
Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 70 (1985) (valuation considerations may explain rule permitting joint
tenant to recover for improvements to property only in partition). It goes almost without saying that
a common feature of many joint tenancies, cotenancies, and business partnerships (and all marriages)
is that the parties have familial ties. In these settings, courts may think either that it is especially likely
that compromises will eventually be reached or that it will be difficult to unravel the numerous
interactions and identify the initial or true wrongdoer.
15. Following, or along with, dissolution, courts may pass on claims for conduct during the
marriage. Remedies may be reflected in the division of property at divorce or in separate judgments.
See, e.g., Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135 (Me. 1993) (allowing action following a no-fault divorce
by former spouse for intentional infliction of emotional distress during marriage); Roland v. Roland,
519 So. 2d 1177 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (finding wife's intemperance constituted independent contributory
cause of marital breakup thus precluding permanent alimony). But it appears that as state legislatures
move toward no-fault divorce, legislatures and courts are less inclined to look back, or at least give less
weight to, behavior within the marriage in dividing property. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 1.1 (2d ed. 1988).
This explanation does not include tort claims between spouses because the evolution away from the
spousal tort immunity is easily linked to the desire to mesh tort claims with typical insurance coverages.
The movement toward allowing these claims within marriage thus does not seem like much of an
exception to the larger love-it-or-leave-it rule.
16. Reva Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings,
1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994).
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find it impossible to collect damages or gain specific performance from a spouse
who for selfish reasons failed to maximize his or her earnings. 7 Whether
courts aim to encourage compromise with a love-it-or-leave-it rule or simply
refuse to monetize or otherwise become entwined in ongoing spousal relations,
there is little doubt that this is an area of law where the expected outcomes are
limited to self-help, private negotiation, or the extreme step of dissolution.
In contrast, a shareholder of a corporation can pursue a claim against an
agent, or fiduciary, while continuing to own stock in the corporation. 8
Somewhat similarly, an employee can sue her employer (and, conversely, the
employee can be sued) without severing the employment relationship. To be
sure, it may be awkward to sue one's boss, but the point is that love-it-or-leave-
it in these cases is a private, rather than a legally imposed, constraint on one's
options. Other fiduciaries can also be sued while their services continue. 9
There is, therefore, the general question of when love-it-or-leave-it rules are
attractive. E°
One indication that this question is unlikely to yield simple answers is that
closely allied areas of law (which is to say similar transactions and relationships)
sport sharply divergent rules. Thus, while marriages and business partnerships
might seem similar-if only because partnerships are often formed among
More generally, an explanation of the love-it-or-leave-it rule in marriage might build on the idea
that women were relatively disadvantaged by a rule that made divorce a prerequisite for other
interspousal claims. The point in the text, however, is that the law might have disadvantaged women
still more by allowing men (and not women) to bring suits in marriage when their expectations were
disappointed. The law was not above such a facially nonneutral rule.
17. Indeed, it would be no simple task to collect explicitly promised amounts. See Miller v. Miller,
42 N.W. 641 (Iowa 1889) (refusing to enforce written agreement between husband and wife promising
fidelity and $200 per year for wife's personal use despite husband's breach by "wasting his money on
other women").
18. In derivative actions in Delaware, for example, the plaintiff must remain a stockholder
throughout the litigation. Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984); In re Resorts Int'l.
Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 9470, slip op. at 31 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 1988), aff'd, 570 A.2d 259 (Del.
1990). See generally ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 650-52 (1986) (contemporaneous
ownership rule normally requires shareholder who brings derivative suit to allege that he was a
shareholder at time of transaction of which he complains-and also to hold shares when bringing suit
and throughout the suit).
19. The remedies available to the beneficiary of a trust, for example, generally include declaratory
judgments interpreting the trust, UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACTS § 2 (1922), injunctions against
wrongful acts, GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 154 (1987), specific performance, id. § 155, and money
damages, id. § 157. These actions need not result in the removal of the trustee. Id.
20. There is a normative and a positive angle to the question, but for the present there does not
seem to be a reason to separate these inquiries. The present inquiry can also be thought of as asking
the positive question of why, if in some areas of law love-it-or-leave-it rules are found attractive, such
rules are not more commonly used. I have tried to ask similar questions about other rules we do not
often find, with the hope that we can learn a good deal about the law that we do experience by
exploring the laws we do not. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Gomorrah to Ybarra and More: The Puzzle of
Immoderate Group Liability, 81 VA. L. REV. 1561 (1995) (puzzle of failure of law to experiment with
extreme form of group liability in order to extract confessions from rational wrongdoers); Saul Levmore,
Obligation or Restitution for Best Efforts, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1411 (1994) (contractual acquaintances
rarely recover for apparently wealth-maximizing precautions); Saul Levmore, The Case for Retroactive
Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 265 (1993) (exploring general hostility to retroactive taxes even though
such taxes have certain attractive qualities).
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relatives-so that their once-analogous love-it-or-leave-it rules suggest
consistency, it is not the case that employer-employee law, or principal-agent
law more generally, has insisted on such exclusivity. For example, in the
principal-agent context, if B contracts with A to sell A's products and to earn
a commission on all sales, B and A may sue one another regarding explicit or
implicit violations of their agreement, even while they continue to enjoy the
going concern value of their relationship by respectively supplying and selling
products as before.21 The exclusivity tradition in partnership law is therefore
especially remarkable because partnerships are easily and most often described
as mutual agency arrangements.
The occasional attraction of love-it-or-leave-it rules is particularly intriguing
because in many cases rules about the exclusivity of remedies are not merely
default rules but are instead virtually mandatory. It can be difficult, if not
impossible, for parties to modify or otherwise escape love-it-or-leave-it rules
through private bargaining. Thus, partnership law has generally permitted a
partner to force a dissolution, but, as we have seen, the traditional rule did not
permit most litigation outside the context of a final accounting. One way to
contract out of the first half of this love-it-or-leave-it rule is to specify that the
partnership is for a set period of time or for a distinct project. In that case,
there is no right to a "free" dissolution but rather an explicit agreement to give
up the right to withdraw for a set period of time.22 However, this strategy for
private ordering does not solve the problem of the partner who seeks judicial
intervention or enforcement of an agreement without separation. Thus, the
love-it-or-leave-it rule may have forced a kind of bundling on some unwilling
players.' Similarly, potential partners might wish to prevent untimely
21. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.15 (1982).
22. See supra note 9, UPA §§ 31, 38, 6 U.L.A. at 376, 456. The rule continues under RUPA § 602,
6 U.L.A. at 553 (dissociation is within power of partner but is wrongful if prior to expiration of definite
term or completion of particular undertaking). The general rule is that every partner has the power
to dissolve a partnership at any time, even though a partnership agreement may try to limit or deter
that power. In particular, the exercise of this power before expiration of a specified term may make
the partner liable for damages. McCall v. Frampton, 415 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1979); Woodruff v. Bryant, 558
S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
23. Similarly, spouses might wish to precommit never to get divorced, but the law does not provide
for this option and makes bargaining around the default rules and in favor of this precommitment
strategy very difficult. In the case of business partnerships, it is preferable to say that the law disfavors
some packages, rather than that it makes them impossible, because it is difficult to know how courts
would react to clever schemes. Thus, parties might use nested partnerships in order to dissolve one
partnership while continuing to do business together in a successor partnership, but with the intention
of using the "dissolution" as a means of getting into court with their claims. It is difficult to know
whether courts, operating under the traditional rules, would be willing to allow such a strategy, and the
most noteworthy thing may be that parties apparently have not tried this route around the love-it-or-
leave-it norm.
The mandatory nature of some of these rules does not make it impossible to describe the love-it-or-
leave-it rules discussed in this article as examples of precommitment strategies. Investors might
occasionally wish to precommit to all-or-nothing rules (no litigation short of dissolution), and this is
indeed what is meant by the possibility of traditional partnership and corporate law offering different
default rules. Similarly, spouses may wish to precommit to be unable to litigate short of divorce, and
it is even remotely possible that nations would want to precommit to ban conventional weapons. See
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dissolution (or threats of dissolution) and also to allow claims within the
ongoing relationship, but under the traditional rule they find it difficult to do
so. Analogously, spouses cannot successfully contract around their love-it-or-
leave-it relationship.
III
EXCLUSIVITY RULES AND BARGAINING
A. Two Kinds of Exclusivity
The domestic relations example suggests that an important aspect of love-it-
or-leave-it rules is the impetus they might give to private bargaining. It is at
least plausible that the threat of withdrawal, be it from marriage or from a
business partnership, facilitates settlement by jeopardizing the value of a going
concern. The law might impose a love-it-or-leave-it framework on parties-who
might themselves be thought of as precommitting to this set of choices or to this
strategy-because of a conviction that they will choose to iron out their
differences in the shadow of destructive dissolutions. The most obvious
alternative regime is one that permits and perhaps even encourages midstream
appeals to judicial authority. One implicit question is whether a love-it-or-leave-
it rule generates more or less private bargaining or compromise than a scheme
that permits ongoing appeals or judicial intervention. Another question is
whether the choice between these schemes is likely to influence the outcome of
private bargaining in an important way.
Consider the relative desirability of two opposing exclusivity schemes. The
first, resembling the traditional partnership rule-and in some respects the law
governing marriages-promises liquidity by offering every participant the right
to exit with the net value of that participant's share in the enterprise, but allows
no other remedy. The threatened coventurers may bargain, especially if the
withdrawal of this participant makes it difficult for those who wish to continue
on to do so, but they instead may think it unlikely that the threat will be carried
out inasmuch as the threatening partner risks losing his share of the going
concern value of the partnership.24 Put differently, the right to exit or dissolve
invites a kind of "chicken" game that almost surely reduces litigation but
occasionally invites the baby to be thrown out with the bath water. This love-it-
or-leave-it strategy may lead to accommodation rather than separation, although
infra part V.D.1. But some of these love-it-or-leave-it strategies seem like unlikely precommitment
strategies. We are accustomed to love-it-or-leave-it precommitments where coalitions are malleable and
voting paradoxes flower, as in Congress agreeing to vote up or down (love-it-or-leave-it) the proposals
of a military base closing commission, but such precommitments would seem unusual or even counter-
intuitive where two parties were concerned. Put differently, it is the (at least somewhat) mandatory
quality of these rules that makes them different and more interesting.
24. All partners may know that the value of the firm exceeds that which a suspicious outsider would
pay. See Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant, supra note 13, at 35 (potential loss of going concern
value discourages liquidation).
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it is surely an empirical question whether such an extreme rule leads to less or
more dissolution than alternative remedy regimes.
The second remedy scheme, resembling the traditional situation in closely
held corporations, allows a participant (shareholder) to bring suits, based on
fault or contractual agreement, against fiduciaries or the ongoing enterprise.
Because courts rarely go so far as to dissolve corporations, one might think of
there being an exclusivity rule of the opposite kind in this arena: "Litigate but
do not leave it. '
B. Choice of Form
One way to think about the comparison between the traditional partnership-
chicken scheme, which anticipates only dissolution (and the threat of it), and the
close-corporation scheme, which encompasses suits for fiduciary breach and
other invitations to judicial monitoring but anticipates no serious threat of
dissolution, is from the perspective of the choice of form. There is a large body
of literature on the choice between the partnership and corporate forms, but
surprisingly little attention is given to the different remedy regimes. If potential
joint venturers believe that threats generate bargains, that judicial monitoring
is costly, time consuming, and prone to error, and that the threat of destruction
of going concern value will only rarely need to be exercised, then they might
well prefer the traditional partnership form with its exclusivity of remedies rule.
Other investors, however, may have greater faith in judicial monitoring or
greater fear of the chicken game created by the love-it-or-leave-it approach
associated with the exclusivity rule of traditional partnership law. In short, an
interesting snapshot of bygone law reveals different default rules associated with
the corporate and partnership forms. Although the choice between these forms
is often described as based on limited liability, governance, or tax consider-
ations, the choice may also be based on the stark contrast in available remedies
regarding internal disputes.
One problem with this view is the mandatory nature of these default rules.
Another problem is that the most natural default rule providing for a right to
exit would seem to be one that guaranteed exit and also allowed litigation in an
ongoing relationship. As suggested below, this may be where both partnership
and corporate law are heading, but the important point for present purposes is
25. In contrast to the partner's right to dissociate, a shareholder cannot demand to be permitted
to exit with a proportional share of the firm's value, unless an appropriate and specific buy-out,
appraisal, or other right has been bargained for or legislated. There is, of course, important
commentary suggesting that there be a right of ready exit from close corporations. See, e.g., J.A.C.
Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the
Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977). It is interesting that Hetherington and
Dooley recommend that their rule be itself love-it-or-leave-it; partnership law is mimicked with the idea
that an investor can force exit or even dissolution if there is otherwise no agreement to buy the offered
shares, but the shareholder who seeks to sell or part ways cannot force partial dissolution. Id. at 50-51.
More generally, the trend in close corporation cases is toward granting exit rights, so that partnership
and corporate law are converging. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 542-44 (7th ed. unab. 1995).
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that the two different default rules associated with traditional partnership and
corporate law can be seen as providing, or perhaps as having once provided, a
conspicuous choice to coventurers.
26
C. Love-It-or-Leave-It and Bargaining Space
A recurring question in the law and economics literature is whether bargains
are more or less likely when there is more uncertainty and more at stake. On
the one hand, parties would not want to expend resources going through trials,
weathering shutdowns and labor strikes, or enduring any of a variety of other
costly skirmishes if there were relatively little to be gained compared to the
costs of conflict. But, on the other hand, risk aversion might lead parties to
settle more readily where the risk of not settling is more substantial. The
obvious analogy is to the variety found in fee-shifting rules. 27 The British rule,
which requires the losing litigant to pay the winner's reasonable attorney's fees,
has something in common with the love-it-or-leave-it rule in that both raise the
stakes for those who insist on proceeding to litigation. One novel but perhaps
simplistic way to think about love-it-or-leave-it rules generally is to recognize
that to the extent they raise the stakes in a dispute by allowing only claims for
final accounting, the law reflects an intuition that settlements (including the
simple decision not to complain) are more likely when there is more uncertain-
ty.2 Of course, this intuition may be wrong. Settlement will also depend on
the parties' relative optimism. 29 And settlement may have more to do with theinformation that parties find worthwhile to share than with the bargaining space
26. For more on the idea of these exclusivity rules as historical default rules and on their future
convergence, see infra part V.D.2.
27. John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the
Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991) (accepting inherited wisdom that fee-
shifting encourages risk-averse parties to settle but questioning claims regarding settlement differentials
when risk effects are ignored).
28. One implication of this perspective is that we might expect to find different love-it-or-leave-it
rules in a jurisdiction with more or less fee-shifting than ours. The simplest form of this suggestion is
that our love-it-or-leave-it rules may be substitutes for fee-shifting rules.
One potential example comes from the law of estates. United States law permits no-contest
provisions in wills so that a testator can force a beneficiary to love it or leave it. If a beneficiary
challenges a will with a no-contest clause, then the beneficiary forfeits his benefits under the will, unless
the challenge has probable cause or likelihood of success, or unless the suit is determined to be one for
the construction of the will. We might expect the British rule to be different because the well-known
fee-shifting in Britain might serve much of the purpose of a no-contest clause. Unfortunately, this
expectation is too difficult to assess. One problem is that rules in both countries are difficult to pin
down. For U.S. law, compare Porter v. Baynard, 28 So. 2d 890 (Fla.) (suit to strike provision as against
rule against perpetuities not a contest of the will), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 810 (1946), with Smithsonian
Inst. v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398 (1898) (giving effect to clause despite contest brought in good faith);
Cocklin's Estate, 17 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 1950) (holding suit to invalidate codicil did not trigger no-contest
clause); Barry v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 135 F.2d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (clause effective absent
allegation of forgery or subsequent revocation); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-905 (last amended 1969),
8 U.L.A. 383 (1983). The British, in turn, appear willing to ignore no-contest clauses when there is
"probable cause." An optimist might say that the British de-emphasize the love-it-or-leave-it strategy
inasmuch as they already have fee-shifting, but the context-specific nature of many of these applications
makes it difficult to compare the British and U.S. rules.
29. See Donohue, supra note 27.
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between them.30  However, rather than pursuing this matter, this article
suggests that the choice of an exclusivity rule can be usefully situated in the
larger literature on the choice between "property rules" and "liability rules."
A discussion of this literature-and some additions to it-now follows.
IV
PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES IN NUISANCE AND PARTNERSHIP
A. Introduction
Inasmuch as most readers will be familiar with the literature just referred to,
it may be useful to begin with a quick explanation of how love-it-or-leave-it
rules, in partnership or elsewhere, tie in to the choice between property and
liability rules. A serious exclusivity rule in partnership law, by way of example,
gives a partner the right to exit and, at least in some sense, the right to bring a
halt to the partnership. Similarly, a property rule in nuisance law might allow
a party to halt the activity of an offending neighbor. The power to stop an
activity-and not simply to collect damages for the injuries it generates-is thus
common to both settings. 31 Correspondingly, the settlement value to a partner
of the threat to withdraw capital and to inflict a suit for final accounting is much
like the endowment effect enjoyed by one who obtains, or might obtain,
injunctive relief against a neighbor's nuisance.
When the property-rule character of the love-it-or-leave-it practice in
traditional partnership law is put this way, it obscures the fact that the most
striking thing about the partnership rule is not that it equips a partner with the
right to stop an activity, or force a dissolution, but rather that it denies a partner
the right to bring liability claims unless dissolution is sought. It is this feature,
often all, that distinguishes (traditional) partnerships from agency and other
arrangements involving personal services which can always be withdrawn. At
the same time, the exclusivity tradition in partnership law raises the question of
whether "property rights" in other areas of law always encompass "liability
rights." This article's strategy, therefore, will be to suggest not only that
partnership, domestic relations, and other law can be understood by thinking of
their remedies in property-liability rule terms, but also that the exclusivity
traditions encountered in these areas of law reflect some light on nuisance law
and other areas where the choice between property and liability rules is already
celebrated-but perhaps not entirely understood.
The next few sections of the article begin with a quick review of Calabresi
and Melamed's property-liability framework and then explore some extensions
30. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate
Coasian Bargaining, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995).
31. Thus, much as an injunction might permit B to stop A's factory, a dissolution right permits B
to stop A's partnership or marriage. On the possibility that a true property right always includes a
"lesser" liability right, see infra text accompanying notes 50-53.
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of this framework in order to prepare for a return to a discussion of love-it-or-
leave-it rules and an attempt to situate these rules and their competitors in the
expanded property-liability framework. Although this is surely not the place to
rethink the Calabresi-Melamed framework, the extensions reported and
developed here may be independently interesting.3 2
B. The Calabresi-Melamed Four-Rule Framework
In the classic setting, one or more residential neighbors, collectively called
B, seeks relief from a neighboring factory, A. In their famous work, Calabresi
and Melamed taught us to consider four options available to a court hearing a
claim by B against A.33 First, the court can decide that A is indeed a private
nuisance, and it can enjoin A. A may be able to bargain around this rule by
buying B's property or simply paying B for permission to do what the court has
agreed to allow B to halt,' but the court will have established the property
rights, or starting point, of this bargaining process. Second, the court can use
a liability rule, requiring A to pay damages to B. Third, the court can do the
opposite of the first rule, permitting A to continue as before. Fourth, the court
can start with the first rule, allowing B to stop A, but it can also require B to
compensate A.
On inspection, this fourth and most celebrated option is conceptually
interesting but unlikely to be terribly appealing except in a very weak form. In
the very circumstances in which it is tempting-perhaps because there is some
fear that B has "come to the nuisance" in order to extort and could just as well
have located elsewhere or perhaps because the defendant enjoys the court's
sympathy for having done nothing actively antisocial-the defendant will often
enjoy increased property values. Specifically, a previously unobjectionable use
or activity is just the sort of enterprise courts will enjoin when there is an influx
of residents.35 Thus, although B complains and wishes to stop A, B has also
enriched A. Put differently, we can imagine that the owner of a feedlot or dog-
breeding enterprise rejoices rather than frets when residential development
approaches. Litigation may of course ensue; however, when this legal conflict
ends, the first property owner, A, is almost certain to enjoy increased wealth,
for development tends to increase property values. Inasmuch as A's land may
be more profitably developed in the future than in the present, it is possible that
A's land will actually fall in value when the court enjoins the current use, but
it is plain that A's property's value has not fallen if measured from some point
32. See Saul Levmore, Rethinking Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Elastic Rules
(draft manuscript, on file with author).
33. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
34. Id. at 1105-06.
35. A well-known example, where coming-to-the-nuisance proves to be no bar to complaints, is
Ensign v. Walls, 34 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. 1948) (residents in conflict with preexisting dog-breeding
operation).
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before B's arrival on the scene. It is no accident that the notable case of Spur
Industries,36 which Calabresi and Melamed anticipated with their fourth rule,
simply held that B must pay A's moving or relocation costs.37 Whatever one's
intuition about the injury A "causes" B, it is also the case that B has caused A's
land to appreciate. The disinclination to award more than relocation costs
reflects either a sense that justice does not call for a double payment from B to
A or a fear of moral hazard.3"
C. Novel Rules
1. The Post-Calabresi-Melamed Literature. If one takes the Calabresi-
Melamed framework to suggest that a variety of mixtures of original endow-
ments, liability rules, checks on moral hazards, and incentives can produce
behaviorally similar, efficient results, then other rules can also be anticipated.
The three extensions offered below illustrate the plasticity of the property-
liability framework in thinking about a wide variety of judicial and other legal
moves. They also illuminate the set of plausible rules in partnership law and
other legal fields where love-it-or-leave-it and exclusivity rules have blossomed.
Students of the torts literature will hardly be surprised by the idea that
Calabresi-Melamed missed some rules. There is, for example, Professor
Polinsky's provocative exploration of "partial property rules," with which courts
might grant injunctive relief to the extent that they are confident and promise
damages where they are not.39 Rather than allowing B to stop A, courts could
allow B to stop A from engaging in some level of operation and award damages
for operation below that level. Inasmuch as this particular extension of the
Calabresi-Melamed framework has no special application to partnerships or
love-it-or-leave-it questions, this article will not dwell on it. One might think
of it as fitting in between Calabresi-Melamed's first and second rules.'
Professors Krier and Schwab, with imagination rivaling that of Calabresi and
Melamed, have suggested another extension of the four-rule framework.4"
They offer as a fifth rule the idea that B stops A, but also pays to A, not A's
36. Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d700 (Ariz. 1972).
37. Id. at 708.
38. If A collects more than its relocation costs, A may decline to convert the use of its property
until litigation takes place. Of course, there is still a more limited moral hazard when A collects bare
relocation costs, because A may defer relocating until such time as a court awards these costs.
39. A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and
Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1075 (1980).
40. This characterization ignores the question of how often there really is the kind of second rule
(B collects damages from A) that Polinsky, supra note 39, for example, builds on. In many settings it
is likely that if a party continued its activity, and anticipated paying damages, a court would eventually
allow punitive damages, criminal law, or even property rules to control the defendant's behavior. In
other circumstances, however, where judges are genuinely uncertain about the relevant costs and
benefits, the attraction of the second rule may be real enough for judges to maintain it. In any event,
when the second rule comes in the form of a strict liability rule (which I will leave unnumbered), there
is no reason to think that the defendant cannot continue its activity as before.
41. James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in
Another Light (Dec. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
LOVE IT OR LEAVE IT
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
costs of moving or some other amount keyed to A's circumstances, but B's
alleged damages.4 2  The idea behind this fifth rule is that when A's activity
causes B $X in harm, B ought to be willing to pay $X in return for A's ceasing
the harmful activity. Because Krier and Schwab structure the rule as an option
given to A,43 this fifth rule might be classified as a property rule.' In any
event, the idea of working with B's enrichment from A's cessation rather than
with A's costs of cessation or conversion to another activity may be attractive
if there is cultural or political sympathy for A or where B's claim is difficult to
verify.
Unfortunately, this fifth rule comes with its own problems. The first of these
problems suggests immediately why one is unlikely to find this rule applied to
partnership disputes. Although the rule may combat the moral hazard of B's
coming to a nuisance and exaggerating damages, because B may be required to
pay that which B claims to have lost while A's activity was in progress, the
mirror-image risk arises that A will create problems for B in order to extract
payments equal to B's damages but far in excess of A's avoidance costs.4 5
Second, an offer-asking problem, or endowment effect, may prevent B from
paying the amount required by this fifth rule, even where A would be unable
to bargain for the right to continue as before if B had been awarded the
property right (as suggested by the first Calabresi-Melamed rule).'
Note also that this fifth rule is not as strange as it first seems. It is true that
we regularly encourage citizens to do X rather than Y by taxing or forbidding
Y, but it is hardly unusual to subsidize X instead. Both the fourth and fifth
rules reward or subsidize A's switching to another activity; one simply looks for
the minimum amount necessary to encourage the switch, while the other asks
42. One could imagine two versions of this rule. In one, B pays if A stops, and in the other, A
must stop and B must pay. Krier and Schwab favor the first, id. at 30-31, perhaps because they like the
idea that misestimation of B's damages need not lead to an inefficient cessation of A's activity. In
contrast, the advantage of the second version is that it controls B's claim. Indeed, the second version
of the rule can be seen as an example of the kind of self-assessment scheme that our legal system could
probably resort to more often.
43. Of course, it could also be seen as an option offered to B to bring suit against A, where such
suit gives A an option to stop and collect damages from B.
44. The fact that B's damages define the amount of the subsidy or incentive to A does not
necessarily turn this into a liability rule, because we normally think of liability rules as compensatory.
45. In some sense the fifth rule is therefore nothing new but rather a clever way of describing the
extortion fear that accompanies too firm a belief in private bargaining. Thus, in a Coasian world, we
can ask why intentional torts need to be actionable, inasmuch as B can always pay A not to kick B, and
so forth. The answer presumably relates to the problem of separating credible from "'mere"
extortionary threats.
46. Thus the fifth rule is not of much help in cases like Rodgers v. Elliott, 15 N.E. 768 (Mass. 1888)
(no liability for extrasensitive plaintiff's alleged injuries from defendant's ringing of church bells). An
extrasensitive person might not have the means with which to buy relief (quietude, for example) from
a noisy neighbor, even though the noisemaker might have been unable to buy the right to make noise
if the right to tranquility had been allocated to the sensitive person in the first place.
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the beneficiary to pay over what it would gain. A bargain might have
materialized anywhere in between these two poles.47
2. Forward-Looking Rules. The remaining extensions of the Calabresi-
Melamed framework draw attention both to temporal flexibility and to the fact
that such flexibility sometimes seems to be kept deliberately out of judicial
bounds. Consider a sixth rule, under which a judge gives no damages for past
injuries suffered by B, but specifies the rate at which, or simply hints that,
damages will be assessed for future injuries if A's behavior continues. Free of
the property-liability framework, one recognizes this strategy as a fine, and is
accustomed to legislative and administrative moves of this sort. Moreover, it is
easy to imagine the occasional attraction of such a rule. Liability seems more
attractive where there is notice, and forward-looking liability has this feature.
More interestingly, when liability is only forward looking, the defendant has a
chance to cease the offensive behavior with no liability at all. The knowledge
that courts are likely to use only forward-looking remedies (of the property or
liability rule type) in some settings may therefore avoid the problem of chilling
activity in the face of uncertainty about what courts will find to be wrongful or
otherwise actionable.
This sixth rule (A pays B's future damages) reveals that the more familiar
second rule (B collects damages from A) is less pliant than it first seems. A
party is unlikely to give up the right to collect past damages without appropriate
consideration. It is one thing to say that if a court uses the second rule, A can
still bargain with B so as to allow A to continue its activity while paying less
than a court's liability rule decrees (and A's payment for past harm should not
affect A's marginal decision about future behavior), but it is quite another for
A to anticipate and then bargain preemptively regarding the likelihood of future
retrospective liability. The prospect of a liability rule may thus be much more
like that of a property rule than it initially seems, because, to the extent that
liability rules encompass damages for past behavior, potential defendants will
wish to bargain in advance before putting themselves in a position where they
can be held liable for past practices. This description of the utility of fines, or
the sixth rule (A pays B's future damages), raises the question of why judges do
not issue exclusively forward-looking liability decisions and why Calabresi-
Melamed miss this option. For now, I note simply that it is not within our legal
culture for judges to do this. Property rules but not liability rules-which is to
say injunctions but not damages-often come in exclusively forward-looking
forms.' Courts can of course come very close to this sixth rule (A pays B's
47. And as for comparing the fourth (B stops A but pays A's net loss) and fifth (B stops A but
pays B's enrichment) rules, it may be useful to note that we often fear subsidies more than taxes,
because the former can be exploited in a way that comes close to moral hazard concerns. However,
we do see a role for subsidies-especially if they must be financed by interest groups that bring about
the policy (favoring the activity that is encouraged by the subsidy) in the first place.
48. See infra text accompanying note 53.
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future damages) without levying fines; for example, they can find that something
was a nuisance only in the very recent past, awarding minimal damages but
promising larger future damages if A's behavior continues. Similarly, they can
begin with the first rule (B stops A) but then sanction the violation of this
injunction with damages. The first of these strategies (or low-level subterfuge)
may be unsuitable where juries are in control of factfinding.49
By focusing on the ability of law to separate the past and future, the
question of the relationship between Calabresi-Melamed's first and second rules
becomes yet more interesting-and suggests still another missing rule. If a court
chooses the first rule and issues an injunction stopping A on behalf of B, does
such a property rule necessarily promise damages for past losses suffered by B
at the hands of A? There is no doubt that a court can and often will provide
injunctive relief along with damages for the past, but the Calabresi-Melamed
analysis implies a separation of the two remedies. Thus, the claim that a
property rule can be superior to a liability rule when the latter involves damages
that are difficult to assess virtually assumes that the property rule listed by
Calabresi-Melamed does not itself include damages for past injuries."
Nevertheless, let us consider their first rule to be the stronger version of a
property rule, so that B stops A and also collects from A for past injuries. This
version is strengthened by the idea that "property" is a bundle of rights
normally thought to include the lesser right of bringing liability suits. In any
event, under this version of the first rule, the second rule (B collects damages
from A) becomes a subset of the first (B stops A and collects from A).
There is, then, room for another rule, which we can label the seventh rule,
under which B stops A but collects no damages for A's past behavior. Note
that both the sixth rule (A pays B's future damages) and the seventh rule (B
stops A but collects no damages) are forward-looking in that they offer no
damages for past injuries. It is easy to see how the seventh option might
empower courts in public law and even in private law cases to take progressive
or even radical steps. Indeed, it is possible that plaintiffs would argue for the
seventh rule (B stops A but collects no damages) over the first (B stops A and
collects from A), if the two were mutually exclusive, although they are not,
because the first may often be too powerful to gain currency. This choice is
examined in terms of plaintiffs' preferences because, as a matter of practice, it
may often be the case that the first and seventh rules are not choices available
to courts so much as to plaintiffs who can decide whether to ask for the seventh
rule.51 In asking for the seventh rule (B stops A but collects no damages),
49. There are, therefore, interesting comparative law implications as to the mix of property and
liability rules found in different legal systems.
50. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 33, at 1092 (commenting on property rule with the point that
once "the original entitlement is decided upon, the state does not try to decide its value"). But see id
at 1119 (comparing entitlement protected by property rule to one protected "only" by a liability rule).
51. This is hardly the place to explore the question of when courts will give relief that no party has
quite requested, or when a party must elect among the available remedies. The point in the text is
simply that when the plaintiff, for example, asks for less rather than more, a court might be more willing
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plaintiffs may preclude their own later claims for damages, but they may make
it easier for courts to give them what they request. By asking for the first rule
(B stops A and collects from A), plaintiffs may create some awkwardness for
courts, which will need to find reasons to give equitable relief but not damages
if giving both seems unwise or unjust.52  In any event, this seventh rule (B
stops A but collects no damages) rings familiar in many areas of public law
where judicially imposed changes in criminal procedure and in the operation of
public facilities such as prisons and schools come about in part because courts
do not feel compelled to apply new law retroactively.53 And we can surely
imagine private law courts giving themselves a choice between the first and
seventh rules (along with others)-even if it is normally the case that plaintiffs
can limit the courts' options by asking for either the second rule (B collects
damages from A) or the seventh rule (B stops A but collects no damages) or
by merging two claims together and thus forcing courts to choose between the
first rule (B stops A and collects from A) and no relief, which may be to say the
third rule (A is unstoppable).54
D. The Property-Liability Framework and Partnership Law
This article has cultivated more theory than can possibly be directly relevant
to understanding love-it-or-leave-it and liability rules in partnership law, and this
is not the place for a full exploration of these rules and their temporal features.
The immediate suggestion is that there are useful connections between
partnership law, or even love-it-or-leave-it rules generally, and the property-
liability rules framework. As previously noted, there are joint ventures where
participants can sue for damages but not necessarily exit, others where the right
to exit and gain one's fair share is the exclusive remedy, and still others where
one can have both the exit option and the right to sue for damages without
to comply.
52. If the plaintiff requests "too much" of an injunction and does not request damages, a court can
tailor the injunction.
53. One method of retrospective application is to permit (or even automatically grant) claims for
damages for past actions.
If Calabresi-Me lamed intend for their first rule (B stops A) to exclude retrospective damages, then
I should have numbered as seventh the option of a powerful property rule that included liability rights.
In any event, there are three rules (first, second, and seventh) where Calabresi-Melamed count only
two. Moreover, this counting itself ignores Polinsky's rule. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying
text.
54. The choice between giving courts or plaintiffs these menu-setting choices is part of what I must
leave for another project. My intuition is that a clever court can virtually always give itself a choice
between the first and seventh options. It can, for example, use the seventh option where the first was
requested by deciding that there is a nuisance to enjoin but that it has only risen to the level of nuisance
(or negligence) in the very recent past.
Note also that the third rule can itself be thought of as a love-it-or-leave-it rule where the party's
option is to stop or leave the relationship with no possibility of damages for what has occurred. In
situations where a party's options are limited to exit and voice, one might think of the third rule as in
effect.
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exiting.55 If the right to exit, or dissolve an arrangement, is recharacterized as
the right to stop the joint venture, then there is the equivalent of the following:
B stops A but collects no damages, B collects damages from A, and B stops A
and collects from A. These are the seventh, second, and first rules discussed
above.
Remarkably, partnership law also adopts the fourth Calabresi-Melamed rule
(B stops A but pays A's net loss). As discussed earlier, when a partnership
agreement is for a specified period or project, or even where it is not but where
courts regard a party's exercising the power to force dissolution as exploitative,
the doctrine of wrongful dissolution can be used to extract damages from the
partner who insisted on stopping the venture.56 There is, therefore, a set of
cases where B can stop A but must pay A damages. The "relocation and
moving costs" referred to in the lone celebrated case noted earlier57 have a
direct counterpart in the damages paid by the wrongful dissolver. And
partnership law, explored in the manner just suggested, reveals at long last a
practical side to Calabresi-Melamed's theoretical ingenuity.
As for the extensions developed here, the fifth rule (B stops A but pays B's
enrichment) would allow a court in a wrongful dissolution case to have the
dissolver pay the partnership not the damages suffered by the partnership or
remaining partners but rather the gain to the dissolver. In cases where the
underlying problem is that partners have a fundamentally different view of how
best to earn profits or what level of risk in which to engage, however, the
wronged partner cannot possibly believe that his damages are less than the
dissolver's gain.58 In all these cases, the advantage of the fifth rule (B stops A
but pays B's enrichment) is absent; its strong point is that it serves as a check
on the damages claimed by a plaintiff, but in the partnership context the
55. See supra part III.A (contrasting corporate rule with traditional partnership rule); supra note
10 ("Revised" Uniform Partnership Act rule allowing dissociation but also permitting other claims).
56. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (rightful and wrongful power to dissolve); supra note
13 (courts finding wrongfulness in order to prevent perceived exploitation).
Note that we might not expect Calabresi-Melamed's third rule (A is unstoppable) in partnership law
because courts would need to force personal services in many cases. See UPA § 31, 6 U.L.A. at 376
("The relation of partners is one of agency. The agency is such a personal one that equity cannot
enforce it even where the agreement provides that the partnership shall continue for a definite time.").
But see supra note 13 for the point that foreign jurisdictions do not allow a partner to force dissolution
of a partnership for a specified term. Of course, many of these jurisdictions are more generally inclined
toward remedies in the specific performance family.
57. Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972).
58. The dissolver may be wrongful either because he breaks an agreement as to the term of the
venture or because he drastically destroys synergy. Either way, the very nature of the complaint against
this dissolver is that there is loss, not gain, in dissolution.
Put quite differently, the fifth rule (B stops A but pays B's enrichment) imitates the worst bargain
that the plaintiff or dissolver, B, would agree to, for it aims to capture his gains from stopping A or the
venture. In the nuisance context, these gains are known because the plaintiff can be asked to claim
damages before the court decides whether to go with the second (B collects damages from A) or fifth
(B stops A but pays B's enrichment) rule. But in the partnership context, the fifth rule would present
a valuation task where none existed before.
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dissolver need not normally self-assess the damages from continuing on with the
venture.59
Finally, the sixth rule (A pays B's future damages) suggests that forward-
looking damages, or judicial fines, are sometimes useful and that a party subject
to this remedy will occasionally find it worthwhile to continue the offensive
behavior and pay the forward-looking damages, fines, or taxes, which the court
has specified or simply threatened in the past. In other settings, the defendant
will prefer the option of ceasing the offense and owing nothing at all. In one
weak sense, partnership law may exhibit this rule as well. If B brings a suit
against her partner A, then, as discussed earlier, it is traditional or possible for
a court to refuse to explore the claim unless a claim for final accounting is
brought at the same time. A, however, is generally free to change his behavior
or to force dissolution himself, so that if A is fearful that one day in a final
accounting B will collect for the matter complained about (but not judicially
decided), A is able to avoid this liability. Moreover, it is at least plausible that
if in a final accounting B complains for the first time about past wrongful
behavior by A, having never expressed this objection to A (by direct communi-
cation or through a rejected lawsuit), a court might discount or even ignore B's
claim. It is thus possible that courts feel quite free subtly to apply the sixth rule
(A pays B's future damages) in partnership law. Unfortunately, it is difficult to
test this hypothesis, if only because courts could not possibly feel limited to the
sixth rule.' But without the property-liability rules framework-and the
extensions suggested here-there would have been no clue to suggest looking
for this explanation of partnership cases.
59. Some of these issues arise in cases where a partner has usurped a business opportunity. But
in these cases valuation problems can normally be entirely avoided by the imposition of a constructive
trust. Indeed, this explains the fact that constructive trust cases form a common exception to the
traditional exclusivity rule in partnership law. See supra note 8; infra note 71 (constructive trust as an
exception that does not implicate serious factfinding resources). Note also that when the offended
partner objects to an alleged usurpation of opportunity, the time that passes between learning about
the usurpation and objecting (or simply bringing a lawsuit) provides an opportunity for one party's
expected gain to exceed the other's losses, because the plaintiff may be able to engage in "strategic
delay" in order to see whether the competing business is something to be envied. See generally Saul
Levmore, Strategic Delays and Fiduciary Duties, 74 VA. L. REV. 863 (1988).
60. If B turns up evil behavior by A, a court would surely be empowered to use the second rule,
though it may defer action until a final accounting.
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SELECTING REMEDIES
A. Bargaining Costs, Error Costs, and Moral Hazards
The literature on why and when judges might, or might be encouraged to,
embrace one or the other of the Calabresi-Melamed rules, or for that matter
choose among remedies in general, is murkier than the framework itself.61
Conventional wisdom is that property rules are appropriate "shortcuts"-that
is, decisions in the presence of, and in an attempt to economize on, transaction
costs-when the likely results of hypothetical bargains are fairly clear.62 For
example, rather than allowing a nuclear weapon to be constructed in A's
backyard, requiring A to pay damages if something goes awry, and expecting
A's neighbors to bargain for A to switch hobbies, a property rule allowing
neighbors (or the state) to stop A provides a convenient shortcut. Theoretically,
a liability rule ought to produce the same result. Therefore, the advantage of
property rules where the hypothetical bargain is clear is either that judges and
especially juries might underestimate damages or that defendants like A might
occasionally be undeterred by damage awards, if only because they anticipate
a judgment-proof future. There might also be some benefit in encouraging
future parties to bargain rather than await officia damage assessments.
Liability rules, in contrast, are regarded as superior when the hypothetical
bargain is less clear, because judicial error as to negligence can be overcome by
the defendant continuing as before while paying damages.63 There may also
be moral and political advantages in allowing judges to balance some of the
wealth effects at stake by requiring the winner in property-rights terms to pay
something to the loser.
In short, liability rules provide judges with flexibility, but the very nature of
these remedies requires time and effort by the factfinder.64 Property rules are
said to be preferable where the parties can bargain better than judges can assess
damages, but this seems to undervalue the point that parties can always bargain
61. There is also the question of when to structure rules with enrichment rather than injury in mind.
See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the
Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 427 (1994).
62. Krier & Schwab, supra note 41, at 13.
63. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 33, at 1119. But see Krier & Schwab, supra note 41, at 15;
Polinsky, supra note 39, at 1111. See also supra note 40 (question of whether parties could really
continue as before and pay damages).
64. In theory, judges could choose wildly high approximations after expending very little time and
effort, and such liability rules might dominate property rules because the defendant would be left with
some room to continue its activity while over-paying for nonnegligently imposed harms. But our
notions of due process make such a low-cost version of a liability rule difficult to fathom. Moreover,
in some settings the wrongdoer can "choose" the liability remedy by destroying the property in
question-unless the law further deters such self-help.
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around liability rules as well.65 As such, the choice seems to depend on the
question of whether the benefit from flexibility, in mitigating wealth effects and
in allowing deadlocked parties to continue as before while paying damages,
exceeds the cost of assessing damages and the danger of behavioral insensitivi-
ty 66
The preceding paragraph summarizes a bargaining-based view of the choice
between property and liability rules. A somewhat different perspective
discounts the differences sketched above and emphasizes instead the moral
hazard problems. Property rules would seem rather generally to create graver
moral hazard problems because the winning party is in a position to extract
payment from the loser whenever the court errs and the value of business-as-
before to the winner exceeds the real costs of injury-as-before to the loser. It
may therefore be profitable to come to a nuisance or to bring a complaint
where no serious harm is really suffered. A liability rule creates a comparable
moral hazard only where there is misassessment and damages are set too high.
Thus, the common preference for liability rules over property rules in tort law
conflicts may reflect an instinct for avoiding moral hazard problems. As already
intimated, the fifth rule (B stops A but pays B's enrichment) may be unappeal-
ing to real judges for the same moral hazard-related reason that subsidies are
often ridiculed in public policy debates. In short, one way to think about these
rules is not as liability versus property, but rather as whether or not a moral
hazard problem is present.
This article has already suggested that the superiority of liability rules on
moral hazard or activity-level grounds becomes even more pronounced when
liability rules can be structured as purely forward-looking.67 But, as also noted,
our legal culture appears to encourage legislators and regulators-but not
judges-to use forward-looking liability schemes. Courts will often find it
awkward to use forward-looking liability rules without also assessing damages
for past conduct and harms. In contrast, they can probably enjoin future
activity without awarding past damages.' A reasonable observer might in the
end think that liability rules are superior because they raise fewer moral hazard
65. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 41, at 24-29. Put this way, the analogy to love-it-or-leave-it
issues is again helpful. Consider, for example, the well-known idea that courts ought to be more willing
to dissolve close corporations if only because, when there is going concern value, the parties can be
expected to salvage this value by bargaining (for an exit price) in the wake of the dissolution decree.
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 25, at 27-29. In theory, the same ought to be true where courts
refuse dissolution, so that there is only a liability right and no property right. The going concern value
ought once again to be preserved by rational bargainers, although the exit price for the dissident will
almost surely be lower than under a property rule assignment which guarantees exit or makes
dissolution more likely. The argument for or against dissolution thus seems to be more about
perceptions of ex post fairness than efficiency.
66. For example, a party's judgment-proof status can enfeeble liability rules.
67. See supra part IV.C.2.
68. See text accompanying notes 50-54 (discussing seventh rule). Some readers might think it the
other way around, that exclusively forward-looking damages are more likely (less awkward for courts
to carry out) than exclusively forward-looking injunctions (which is to say property rules with no
damages for the past).
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dangers, but that courts nevertheless occasionally choose property rules in order
to economize on their own decision costs. In any event, it is likely that parties
themselves behave in the shadow of backward-looking liability rules very much
as they might be expected to in the face of anticipated property rules.
B. Valuation Tasks and Liability Rights in Partnership but Not in Marriage
Returning to partnership disputes, consider again the idea that the ability to
force dissolution and a final accounting be regarded as a property right while
the ability to bring suit for wrongful behavior, fiduciary breaches, and so forth
be thought of as a liability right. As previously noted, the love-it-or-leave-it
tradition in partnership law reflects the kind of property right that includes the
lesser right to a liability rule because courts will permit the parties to bring
other complaints to their attention once a final accounting is underway.69
Indeed, under the traditional partnership rule, the very point of bringing a claim
for one's "property right" of final accounting and dissolution may be to get a
hearing on a liability matter that the complaining party would in fact have
preferred to bring without severing the relationship.
The previous section of this article reviewed the idea that one strategy for
choosing between property and liability rules (assuming for the moment that
these are the only two choices) is to favor the less flexible property rules when
liability is particularly difficult for courts to assess. This perspective offers a
quick insight into partnership remedies once one recognizes that, in dissolution,
judges will be required to undertake the very same valuation tasks that can be
avoided by refusing liability rights. If the usual advantage of property rules is
that judges need not assess damages, then it is critical to see that this very
advantage is absent here because a final accounting requires these very
valuation exercises. Put slightly differently, property rules may sometimes be
preferred over liability rules in order to avoid the explicit valuation tasks
associated with the latter," but this distinction evaporates in the partnership
setting because a party's property right of exit requires an evaluation of the
worth of the partnership-not to mention an assessment of deferred claims
among partners that could not be brought before the property-right trigger was
pulled.
One cannot go so far as to say that property rules necessarily dominate
liability rules in this setting. After all, the valuation task is deferred and may
ultimately be avoided when a love-it-or-leave-it (or property) rule scheme is
used.71 The argument for a love-it-or-leave-it rule on these grounds must
69. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54 (comparing first and seventh rules).
70. There are implicit valuation tasks associated with most property rules, as when a judge must
assess whether a factory is a nuisance or not.
71. And, indeed, one conventional explanation for the exclusivity rule in partnership law was that
it economized on judicial resources. See, e.g., Schuler v. Birnbaum, 405 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1978) (exclusivity rule promotes judicial economy by preventing piecemeal litigation). The
exception in which the court could impose a constructive trust obviously fits this explanation.
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therefore be based on the likelihood of private bargaining and its ability to
avoid the costs associated with the litigation (or separation) that a liability right
might generate. The traditional love-it-or-leave-it rule was hardly ridiculous, for
it is surely possible that it encouraged private ordering and economized on
judicial valuation tasks. Nevertheless, the move toward a liability rule can be
understood as attractive because the valuation tasks associated with the liability
claim were not necessarily avoided by the property rule in the first place.
The comparison with the law of domestic relations is instructive. The love-
it-or-leave-it rule governing marriage7 2 might be regarded as economizing on
valuation work, among other things, because, even when parties proceed to
divorce, courts can often avoid performing the valuation tasks that would be
necessary if married persons had liability rights. It is, after all, often the case
that decisions about divorce, child custody, support payments, and so forth can
be made without assessing the harm imposed earlier by implicit or explicit
breaches of the marriage arrangement.73 For this reason alone, it is not
surprising that the law of partnership remedies has moved further and more
quickly toward a liability rule than has the law of marriage and divorce. The
contrary view is that many divorces do involve courts in difficult decisions, so
that the preference for a love-it-or-leave-it rule requires one to consider cultural
factors or to face the fundamental question of whether love-it-or-leave-it rules
can be expected to lead to more rather than less compromise.74 Inasmuch as
this article next turns to a different argument about love-it-or-leave-it rules for
marriage, it is useful to assume that valuation tasks are indeed avoided by a
love-it-or-leave-it rule in the law of domestic relations.
The focus on valuation tasks suggests less early intervention in marriages.
At the same time, the role of moral hazard dangers in choosing among remedies
suggests that in both marriage and business partnership settings, if there is to be
judicial intervention, there might be a greater range of available remedies than
in much of tort or other law. The reason is that parties would seem less likely
to enter, or to be able to enter, marriage or partnership arrangements simply to
profit from exit. For example, a court that hesitated to invoke the fifth rule in
a nuisance case, for fear that the prospect of payment to A of B's alleged
damages might cause A to engage in an activity that is likely to be injurious to
B, might be more likely to experiment with a partnership (or even a marriage)
case where such very ex ante moral hazard seems unlikely.75
72. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
73. See CLARK, supra note 15, § 1.1.
74. For the sake of argument, this analysis assumes that the law regards more compromise as a
good thing.
75. Once there is conflict in a partnership or marriage, the moral hazard problem returns. Partners
and spouses are surely capable of engaging in offensive behavior and thus imposing costs on their
partners, in order to gain bargaining advantage, even where there is no intrinsic gain to the actor. But
the fact that the relationship itself is relatively unlikely to be entered into in order to gain this sort of
advantage suggests that there may be more room for some moral hazard-prone remedies here than in
standard tort cases.
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A comparison of nuisance and partnership claims emphasizes the idea that
one way to think about the evolution of partnership law is to focus on the
valuation tasks peculiar to dissolution conflicts in that area of law. When B
seeks to shut down A, the injunction or property rule sought by B requires no
explicit valuations by the supervising judge; a rough calculation might be needed
in order to decide whether this property rule is the appropriate shortcut, but no
precise measurement is required.76 In contrast, when a partner moves to "shut
down" a partnership, the final accounting that must be undertaken includes the
very same valuation tasks as the liability suit that was shunned earlier because
of the traditional love-it-or-leave-it rule.
C. Property Rules and Not Liability Rules for Domestic Relations
This article has suggested in passing that a love-it-or-leave-it rule for parties
to a marriage contract may be superior, at least from a court's perspective, to
a liability rule because the former may first postpone and then entirely avoid
difficult valuation tasks. The property-liability framework points to a much
stronger explanation for love-it-or-leave-it rules in marriage law.
It is easy to regard the love-it-or-leave-it rule for marriage as anachronistic.
There is some irony to the claim that parties to a marriage should not litigate
but should work out their problems. First, the same might be said of most other
parties in conflict; if courts think that peaceful settlement is promoted by a love-
it-or-leave-it rule in marriage, then it is not entirely obvious why courts do not
extend that intuition to parties to other contracts.77 Second, and more
important, it is precisely in the area of domestic relations, where the love-it-or-
leave-it rule is most robust, that a substantial industry of counseling and
mediation has arisen. Private parties can be said to react to the mandatory
love-it-or-leave-it rule by "litigating" in the shadow of the courthouse and
turning to pastors, psychologists, and other counselors. The demand for these
nonjudicial services might be regarded as a clamor for a liability remedy where
none is offered by law.
Put differently, when there is conflict in marriage and dissolution is a risk,
the parties' friends normally appear to think that third-party intervention
promotes, rather than threatens, compromise and long-term peaceful,
pleasurable coexistence. It is no accident that mediation has blossomed most
in the very context in which the love-it-or-leave-it rule stands most firm in the
courtroom. Why then do judges not supply law where it is apparently sought?
The question returns us to the nature of property and liability rules in
different settings. It is useful to think of the remedies available to courts in
business and then in marriage arrangements. Monetary relief is of course
common in shareholder-corporate disputes, and it is easy to use in partnership
cases where the traditional love-it-or-leave-it rule has fallen. Specific
76. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 33, at 1120.
77. Parties might agree that any suit for breach releases the other party from further performance.
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performance is less common if only because it will often require postjudgment
supervision. Such supervision is especially difficult and distasteful where
personal services would be required from one who does not wish to perform.
Injunctive relief is, of course, a kind of specific performance, and some
structural injunctions do involve a great deal of monitoring (for example, prisons
and school systems that do not wish to perform as required by courts). These
exceptional examples make clear why courts would not wish to supervise
decrees regarding married persons. Yet in most marriages, assets are
commingled. It is thus hard to imagine most courts agreeing to use liability
rules without a divorce decree because the judgment would have little effect if
the spouses did not have separate financial lives. The alternative of specific
performance would require enormous judicial involvement. Although courts do
need to undertake some involvement after divorce, as when parties do not live
up to their judicially imposed responsibilities regarding the payment of child
support or facilitating visitation rights, the love-it-or-leave-it rule is unsurprising
when one realizes the enormous tasks courts would be required to undertake
were there in-marriage remedies.78 Finally, courts are simply not in the
business of counseling or issuing advisory opinions to private parties.
This analysis suggests that the valuation idea does explain a great deal of the
love-it-or-leave-it pattern. Even if marriage is an exception rather than another
example of this theme, the use of the love-it-or-leave-it rule in marriage is best
explained by the observation that a liability rule is essentially unworkable in a
world where most spouses commingle their financial resources.
D. Love-It-or-Leave-It Revisited
1. Intuitions about Love-It-or-Leave-It Rules in Disparate Settings. What,
then, explains the exclusivity rule as embodied in the first and seventh property
rules in traditional partnership law? One possibility is that private bargaining
is more likely if liability suits are unavailable. But, as already noted, if the
parties can bargain, it should often make little difference whether they are
bargaining around a property rule or a liability rule.79 It is plausible, however,
78. Note that, consistent with the analysis in the text, there is room for in-marriage remedies of the
property-rule kind. Where there is a fear of violence, for example, one spouse may get a restraining
order against another. More generally, when courts chip away at the love-it-or-leave-it rule, we should
expect them to do so where there are modest valuation tasks and property-rule like remedies. Thus,
it would not be shocking if a court came to the assistance of a spouse who wished to stop another from
undertaking an imprudent investment. Still, such interventions are not to be expected outside of
community property jurisdictions. Compare Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (holding
unconstitutional Louisiana statute that allowed husbands, but not wives, to execute mortgages on jointly
owned property without spousal consent), with McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953)
(insisting that "public policy" requires rejection of wife's complaint about insufficient financial support).
One should recognize that when these rules were developed, spouses were regarded by the law as
having separate financial assets and lives. Put differently, 50 years ago courts could have required one
spouse to pay damages to the other, but they did not. The story in the text is thus incomplete, but
might be enriched by adding the reality of limited liquid assets.
79. See supra part V.A.
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that with more at stake under a love-it-or-leave-it rule, parties may shy away
from going to court with their conflicts.'
Imagine, as a first example, a labor law rule that barred litigation either in
court or through the National Labor Relations Board unless the union was on
strike or locked out. Under such a rule, the two sides to a collective bargaining
agreement would have a "property right" to stop work but no stand-alone
liability rule as a remedy. My intuition is that most observers would think that
such a love-it-or-leave-it rule would generate more strikes and social costs than
the present regime, which is more permissive of litigation including a kind of
forced arbitration. The love-it-or-leave-it rule might, of course, also stimulate
additional compromises (because not all disputes need trigger strikes), but the
point is that there might be greater rather than smaller social and private costs
under such an extreme rule.
Consider, by way of comparison, the now-familiar love-it-or-leave-it rule
regarding conflicts between spouses. The parties are unable to bargain around
this rule; a prenuptial contract regulating responsibilities within a marriage and
in the event of divorce may carry weight in the event of a divorce, but it is most
unlikely to open up the courthouse doors during a marriage. Courts treat
marriage as a rather extreme love-it-or-leave-it arrangement. Here, most
observers may sense that the love-it-or-leave-it rule does not increase the social
costs and likelihood of divorce. There is obviously much to be said about
strategic behavior and cultural norms in both the marriage and collective
bargaining contexts. The narrow point is that these contrasting intuitions reflect
the idea that it is by no means obvious whether love-it-or-leave-it rules, which
is to say property rules, or "cliffs,"81 promote compromises or hostile separa-
tions.
To use one more example, consider the role of mutually assured destruction
in game theory about warfare.' It is plausible that there is less war where
there is mutually assured destruction, much as it is possible that there is less
litigation (and dissolution) with love-it-or-leave-it rules. But the more telling
comparison is whether a nation or a pair of nations would be better off armed
with nuclear weapons and capable of mutually assured destruction-while
possessing no conventional weapons at all. Is it plausible that superpowers
would be better off giving up their conventional weapons in order to have only
the threat of nuclear weapons? My intuition is that most of us think that
80. This is the argument set aside in part III.C, supra.
81. The idea is that when rules present actors with the prospect of serious liability if they step over
a thin, uncertain line, these actors might be overdeterred and stand back from the line or "cliff." See
SAUL LEVMORE, FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99 (1994) (suggesting that the kink or cliff or
overdeterrence effect generally assumes that full rather than incrementally caused damages will be
assigned to the negligent tortfeasor); John Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984). Love-it-or-leave-it rules would seem to
have this feature as well.
82. Of lasting value is THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 119-61,230-54 (1960).
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conventional weapons, and their liability rule counterparts, reduce the
opportunity for exploitation and even the likelihood of mutual destruction.8 3
Nevertheless, it is plausible that parties would benefit from a choice between
a property rule and a liability rule, or between mutually assured destruction
alone and conventional weapons along with mutually assured destruction.
Different intuitions about games of chicken or different reactions to different
settings could easily lead to a preference for one scheme or the other.
2. Explaining the Traditional Rule in Partnership. The exclusivity rule in
partnership' might also be explained by returning to the earlier discussion
about the choice of business form. Once upon a time, coventurers could
choose between a love-it-or-leave-it and a liability rule by selecting either the
partnership or corporate form. But in a world in which this choice is dominated
by tax and governance considerations, there is no room for an exclusivity rule
of the kind once found. It is therefore not surprising that the corporate and
partnership rules have drifted closer to one another.
At the same time, the remedies have not quite converged. The evolved
partnership law norm approximates the first rule86 : a right to dissolution along
with a right to sue for damages in an ongoing relationship. The evolved
corporate norm is closer to the second rule (B collects damages from A), with
a hint, and not a guarantee, of an exit right, except where an appraisal remedy
or other developments creep in. It would not be surprising if the convergence
trend continued. Thus, one might expect courts more often to imply agreements
for partnerships of specified terms in order to withdraw the claim-free, or
untaxed, right to exit.87 Alternatively, corporate law might increasingly grant
requests for dissolution (or appraisal), in which case that body of law will
become more like contemporary partnership law.88 If there is convergence,
and a shared default rule materializes, there will be some room for debate as
to whether the shared rule is efficient or instead supplants what had been useful,
alternative default rules. 89 In any event, one aim of this article is to draw
attention to the idea that the law of remedies in partnership and corporate law
83. To the extent that it is plausible that nuclear deterrents alone would make sense if there were
only superpowers, and no smaller enemies to fear, an interesting observation is that we are most
inclined toward the love-it-or-leave-it-like extreme where peers are involved. Partnerships, marriages,
and superpowers can be said, at least ideally or in theory, to be bargaining as equals, unlike principals-
agents, corporations-shareholders, and many other areas where love-it-or-leave-it can be said to have
been rejected (such as states-citizens). Because there are important counterexamples, where "peers"
have ongoing litigation, this article does not pursue this theme. These counterexamples include
employers-unions and, more generally, parties to most contracts.
84. See supra notes 5, 7 and accompanying text.
85. See supra part III.B.
86. The labels refer again to the first through seventh rules, sketched supra in parts II.B, IV.C.
87. See supra note 13.
88. See supra note 25.
89. See generally Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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once offered alternative and very different default rules but is narrowing over
time.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the evolution of partnership law has not only
been from the mold of the seventh rule (B stops A but collects no damages')
to that of the first (B stops A and collects from A), but also may have shifted
toward nonmandatory default rules. The traditional exclusivity rule was
substantially mandatory.9 The question is whether the modern trend toward
allowing actions while the partnership continues without an accounting92
anticipates letting partners opt out of this permissive rule into a love-it-or-leave-
it scheme.93 If so, which is to say that agreements not to bring actions will be
enforceable or will at least provoke claims all their own, then the Calabresi-
Melamed framework is all the more appropriate. That framework, after all,
anticipates private bargaining around the rules, except for unusual cases of
inalienability.94 Put in more negative terms, one drawback to thinking about
the traditional partnership remedy and other love-it-or-leave-it rules in property-
liability terms is that the property-liability framework too easily obscures the
mandatory nature of some of these remedy rules.
E. The Survival of Love-It-or-Leave-It in Domestic Relations Law
The love-it-or-leave-it rule in domestic relations has come to look rather
lonely. This article has suggested that its survival can be explained more by the
disinclination of courts to deal with the enforcement of liability rules in the
family setting than by the advantages of love-it-or-leave-it rules.95 It is
possible, of course, that the love-it-or-leave-it rule in marriage will yield, as it
did in business partnerships, to other rules. But the trend in the law of domestic
relations can be described as heading toward yet stronger love-it-or-leave-it
rules, in that courts seem less interested than before in assigning "fault" during
marriage.96 At the same time, the level of judicial supervision required post-
divorce regarding child custody and support payments may soon persuade courts
that their jobs might in fact be easier if there were more intervention during
marriages.
90. That is, unless there were wrongs that can now be assessed at the time of final accounting.
91. See supra text accompanying note 22.
92. See supra note 23.
93. Although we are accustomed to courts supporting precommitments to go to arbitration rather
than formal litigation, courts will surely be troubled by some agreements to forgo litigation. On the
other hand, courts might be inclined to allow private agreements for love-it-or-leave-it rules where the
parties are seen as bargaining equals.
94. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 33, at 1123-24, note the possibility of giving a polluter an
inalienable right to pollute in some specified amount. This can be seen as a love-it-or-leave-it rule.
95. Approximately one-third of the states have adopted "no-fault" statutes regarding the granting
of divorce. WALTER WADLINGTON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 1033
(2d ed. 1990).
96. See supra note 15.
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VI
CONCLUSION
Contract law itself has evolved away from a love-it-or-leave-it rule and
toward ongoing liability rules. There was a time when to bring a claim against
one's supplier, for example, was to terminate the supply contract.97 Over time
it appears that most parties, and therefore judges, came to prefer an expansion
of remedies and, in particular, the possibility of legal intervention in a
continuing contractual relationship. A sensible explanation of this and other
evolutionary examples is probably that our culture, both legal and general,
prefers more rather than fewer remedies and is generally disinclined to adopt
a strategy of encouraging compromise and peace by denying the opportunity for
modest skirmishes. It is, of course, also conceivable that this evolution is
efficient. There seems to be no evidence that parties or lawmakers systematical-
ly learned that love-it-or-leave-it rules generated greater social costs (or even
private costs98 ) than alternative remedy schemes, but it is possible that the law
improves in mysterious ways.
If the story of these love-it-or-leave-it rules and their demise (outside of
domestic relations law) reflects evolution in the direction of additional remedies,
it becomes yet more important to learn to match specific remedies with
particular circumstances. This article has suggested that we pay more attention
to the remedies that we still struggle to imagine. Love-it-or-leave-it rules,
forward-looking damage rules, and subsidies as substitutes for taxes have
something in common, for they seem less unusual when closely examined and,
once investigated, they look like plausible candidates for new roles in the future.
97. The rule was that a partial claim often precluded a later claim, because only one action was
permitted. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 635 (2d ed. 1990).
98. It is possible that additional remedies transform the private costs of bargaining into externalized
costs for the court system. However, this effect is likely to be limited. Litigation may involve large
costs that the parties do not bear, but litigation itself appears to generate very substantial private costs,
if only because private bargaining is less constrained by formal rules.
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